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NOTE
RAISING THE DEFENSE OF
PROCEDURAL DEFAULT SUA
SPONTE: WHO WILL ENFORCE THE
GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY?
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently declared in a unanimous decision
that "[a federal] court of appeals is not 'required' to raise the issue of
procedural default sua sfonte" while reviewing a state prisoner's pe-
tition for habeas corpus. The same rule presumably applies to all fed-
eral courts conducting habeas review and is not limited to courts of
appeals. In its brief opinion,2 the Court re-enforced its previous hold-
ing "that in the habeas context, a procedural default... is not a juris-
dictional matter.' 3 Rather, federal courts conducting habeas corpus
review of a state prisoner's conviction recognize procedural default in
the state court only on the basis of comity and concerns of federal-
ism.4 The Supreme Court clarified that "procedural default is nor-
mally a 'defense' that the State is 'obligated to raise' and 'preserv[e]'
if it is not to 'lose the right to assert the defense thereafter."' 5
Although clearly holding that a federal court is not required to
raise the state's defense of procedural default, the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly refused to resolve the next logical question, whether a federal
court is permitted to raise the defense.6 The Court's justification for
not addressing this issue was that the question was not properly be-
' Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997).
2 See generally id. The Supreme Court concluded that "[p]recedent makes clear that the
answer to the question presented is 'no."' Id. at 89.
3 Id. at 89 (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997); Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 501 U.S. 722, 730-31 (1991)).
4 See id.
5 Id. (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 159 (1996)).
6 See id. at 90 ("We recognize some uncertainty in the lower courts as to whether, or just
when, a habeas court may consider a procedural default that the State at some point has waived,
or failed to raise. Nonetheless, we do not believe this is an appropriate case in which to exam-
ine that question .... ") (citations omitted).
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fore it.7 Implicitly, however, the Court recognized that the issue has
not been resolved and, without hinting at a resolution, recognized dis-
agreement on this issue among the lower federal courts. 8
Arguably, the Court's refusal to resolve the issue of raising pro-
cedural default sua sponte foreshadows future consideration. While
not every legal issue is ultimately addressed by the Supreme Court,9
the disparity of treatment by lower federal courts and the important
principals of comity and federalism 1° that are involved beg for a clear
resolution. Although the issue remains unresolved by the Supreme
Court, sua sponte invocation of procedural default occurs frequently
in the lower courts." In fact, most circuits have ruled on this issue.
Once the remaining circuits have spoken, the Supreme Court may be
prepared to decide.
This Note identifies previous developments in habeas corpus ju-
risprudence and the policies justifying the conclusion that raising the
defense of procedural default sua sponte is not permissible in our ad-
versarial system. First, this Note addresses whether a procedural de-
fault in state court should operate to bar federal review regardless of
how the defense is raised. If, as the Supreme Court has concluded in
the past, such a default should not bar federal review, sua sponte in-
vocation by the federal court is no longer an issue. Second, this Note
discusses the various circuit decisions which have held in favor of
raising procedural default sua sponte. Although the United States
Courts of Appeals clearly favor raising procedural default sua sponte,
closer examination of their decisions reveals their unanimity is illu-
sory. Finally, this Note considers, in the context of our adversarial
system, the independent interests and policies of federal courts that
argue for and against sua sponte invocation of procedural default.
7 See id. at 90-91 (stating that the question of whether state procedural default could be
raised sua sponte was improper because the lower court believed that it was bound by circuit
precedent to raise the issue).
8 See id. at 90 (comparing Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515 (1 lth Cir. 1995) (holding that
sua sponte invocation of procedural default serves no important federal interest) to Hardiman v.
Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that comity and scarce judicial resources may
justify court raising state procedural default sua sponte)).
9 See Sup. Cr. R. 10 ("Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judi-
cial discretion.").
'0 See Stephanie Dest, Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Procedural Default:
An Abstention-Based Interest Analysis, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 264 (1989). This author states
that:
The procedural default/habeas corpus issue has not lent itself easily to doctrinal
analysis since its resolution, as characterized by the Supreme Court, is thought nec-
essarily to involve a conflict between two important governmental interests: pro-
viding a federal forum for the vindication of constitutional rights and reinforcing the
procedural integrity of state criminal justice systems.
Id. (citing Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
11 See infra Part 1 (canvassing the opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals re-
garding the issue of raising procedural default sua sponte).
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One such policy is the presumption in favor of federal review when
state court decisions address federal issues but do not clearly indicate
reliance upon independent and adequate state grounds. Arguably this
presumption in favor of federal review suggests a policy that is con-
trary to any notion of sua sponte invocation of procedural default.
After weighing the arguments, this Note concludes that, in spite of the
growing restrictions on federal habeas review, a rule permitting sua
sponte invocation of procedural default would simply go too far.
I. PERSPECTIVE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Courts, Congress, and scholars alike have consistently regarded
the availability of the writ of habeas corpus with the utmost rever-
ence.12 At least one historian has referred to the writ as "the great writ
of liberty."'13 Justice Brennan in 1963 wrote that "[w]e do well to bear
in mind the extraordinary prestige of the Great Writ... in Anglo-
American jurisprudence: 'the most celebrated writ in the English
law."",14 As Justice Brennan continued, "'there is no higher duty than
to maintain it unimpaired."",
15
The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, referred to as simply
the writ of habeas corpus,' "confers upon a prisoner the right to re-
quest that the judiciary consider the constitutionality of his deten-
12 As Justice Frankfurter explained:
It is not the boasting of empty rhetoric that has treated the writ of habeas corpus as
the basic safeguard of freedom in the Anglo-American world. 'The great writ of ha-
beas corpus has been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.' Its history and function in our legal system and the unavailabil-
ity of the writ in totalitarian societies are naturally enough regarded as one of the de-
cisively differentiating factors between our democracy and totalitarian governments.
The significance of the writ for the moral health of our kind of society has been
amply attested by all the great commentators, historians and jurists, on our institu-
tions.
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (citation omitted) (quoting Exparte Yerger, 75 U.S.
85, 95 (1868)). The Supreme Court has also stated that:
It is no accident that habeas corpus has time and again played a central role in na-
tional crises, wherein the claims of order and of liberty clash most acutely, not only
in England in the seventeenth century, but also in America from our very begin-
nings, and today. Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure,
its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of per-
sonal liberty.
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977).
13 WILLANi F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPus 3 (1980).
14 Nola, 372 U.S. at 399-400 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs *129).
15 Id. at 400 (quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19,26 (1939)).
16 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75 n.6 (1976) ('It is now well established that
the phrase 'habeas corpus' used alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad sub-
ficiendum, known as the 'Great Writ."').
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tion."'17 At the heart of the writ is the "principle... that in a civilized
society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a
man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to con-
form with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is en-
titled to his immediate release.' ' 18 One commentator describing the
purpose and significance of the writ wrote:
The writ's greatness derives from its function of inquiring
into the legality of an individual's confinement.... Its pur-
pose is neither to compensate the prisoner for past injustice
nor to penalize the policeman or judge whose behavior gives
rise to the proceeding.... Rather, the purpose of habeas cor-
pus is to insure the integrity of the process resulting in im-
prisonment. Although it is put into operation by a particular
prisoner, whose incentive is his own release, its objective is
institutional reform. Habeas corpus is the structural reform
mechanism of the criminal justice system, functioning to
provide an avenue to vindicate substantive rights.19
Traditionally, the writ of habeas corpus has been characterized as
an independent civil remedy rather than a stage of a criminal pro-
ceeding or an appeal.2° Consequently, habeas corpus is commonly
thought of as a collateral attack on unlawful imprisonment that is
separate from direct appeal. On direct appellate review of a state
court judgment, the Supreme Court "is concerned only with the judg-
ments or decrees of state courts. '21 If an error is discovered, "the Su-
preme Court, on direct review, can only reverse the case and remand
it to the state courts. 22 On direct review, the Supreme Court does not
have the power to bring about the prisoner's release directly. How-
ever, a federal court conducting collateral habeas corpus review does
possess the power to release the prisoner. In fact, a federal habeas
court "has no other power; it cannot revise the state court judgment; it
can act only on the body of the petitioner.' 23 As a consequence of its
17 Benjamin Robert Ogletree, Comment, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Chapter 154:The Key to the Courthouse Door or Slaughterhouse Justice?, 47
CATH. U. L. REv. 603, 620 (1998) (footnote omitted).
'" Noia, 372 U.S. at 402.
19 DUKER, supra note 13, at 3.
20 As the Supreme Court has explained:
"[Tihe traditional characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as an original...
civil remedy for the enforcement of the right to personal liberty, rather than as a
stage of the state criminal proceedings or as an appeal therefrom, emphasizes the in-
dependence of the federal habeas proceedings from what has gone before.
Noia, 372 U.S. at 423-24 (footnotes omitted).
21 Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
22 William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in
Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423,436 (1961).
23 Id. (citing In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 173 (1890)); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, State
Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1128, 1151 (1986). This author explains
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"independence ' 24 from direct appellate review, res judicata does not
apply to habeas corpus litigation.
A. The Source of the Writ
The writ of habeas corpus existed in English law long before the
birth of the United States.2 The writ was considered a fundamental
protection against unjust imprisonment and, as such, was incorporated
into our Constitution.27 At a time when "[tihe states were conceived
of as the primary protectors of individual liberty,' 28 the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution was intended "to restrict Congress from
suspending state habeas for federal prisoners." 29 Arising out of the
fears that created our system of federalism, the Suspension Clause
was envisioned as a necessary protection from the federal govern-
ment.30 The Judiciary Act of 1789, which granted federal court juris-
diction, also gave federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas
corpus. This authority, however, extended only to federal prison-
ers.32 The Supreme Court noted in Fay v. Noia33 that "the first
that "the refusal to give effect to a state procedural rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings did
not make it unlawful for the state court to apply the rule in similar circumstances in the future."
This author also states, however, that:
Of course, the impact on state courts ... cannot be measured solely by determining
whether federal law forbids the states from applying a procedural rule in future
cases. Even in the absence of any federal prohibition, state courts may be under
substantial pressure to relax their procedural rules in future cases. A state court that
takes any other course risks having a federal question it has deemed forfeited survive
on direct or collateral review. It may be burdensome for the state to litigate for the
first time whether the default should be excused, and if so, to consider the merits of
the claim, long after the default has occurred.
Id. at 1152-53 (footnote omitted).
24 Noia, 372 U.S. at 424.
2s See id. at 423 ("[Ihe familiar principle that resjudicata is inapplicable in habeas pro-
ceedings, is really but an instance of the larger principle that void judgments may be collaterally
impeached.") (citations omitted); DUKER, supra note 13, at 6 ("The principle of res judicata
does not apply to habeas corpus litigation in the American courts.") (footnote omitted); see also
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[H]abeas corpus cuts
through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in
subordination to the proceedings .... ").
26 See DUKER, supra note 13, at Ch. 1.
27 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
2 DUKER, supra note 13, at 181.
2' Id. at 8.
30 See id. ("Underlying the purpose of the habeas clause was the fear of federal govem-
ment.").
31 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81 (1845).
32 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1976) ("The authority of federal courts to
issue the writ of habeas corpus ... was included in the first grant of federal-court jurisdiction,
made by the Judiciary Act of 1789, with the limitation that the writ extend only to prisoners held
in custody by the United States.") (citation omitted); see also Ogletree, supra note 17, at 621
("The federal courts' power to grant habeas corpus petitions initially was confined to prisoners
detained under federal authority.") (footnote omitted).
'3 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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Judiciary Act did not extend federal habeas to prisoners in state cus-
tody.
34
After the Civil War, the balance of state and federal power un-
derwent a dramatic upheaval. Some commentators have argued that
the states no longer remained the primary protectors of civil liberty.35
Driven by resistance from former Confederate states opposed to new
federal civil rights,36 Congress amended the federal habeas corpus
statutes in 1867 to authorize "federal trial courts to issue writs of ha-
beas corpus on behalf of any person in custody 'in violation of the
constitution' even though state authorities were responsible for the
detention. 37 In order to carry through federal policy, federal habeas
was allowed in state cases. 38 At this time, Congress had expanded the
federal court jurisdiction with respect to habeas review to its consti-
tutional limits.
39
It should be noted that Congress could have enforced federal
rights through other methods besides collateral habeas corpus re-
view.4t Congress "might well have decided entirely to circumvent all
state procedure through the expansion of existing federal removal
statutes... thereby authorizing the pretrial transfer of all state crimi-
nal cases to the federal courts whenever federal defenses or claims are
3 Id. at 409 (1963) (citation omitted); see also DUKER, supra note 13, at 8 ("Because state
habeas was secured against federal interference, it was unnecessary to provide federal habeas
for state prisoners.").
35 See Dest, supra note 10, at 263 ("[A] great shift in the American federal system...
displaced the states as the primary protectors of constitutional rights.") (footnote omitted).
36 See Noia, 372 U.S. at 415 ("In 1867, Congress was anticipating resistance to its Recon-
struction measures and planning the implementation of the post-war constitutional Amend-
ments."); Brennan, supra note 22, at 426 ('In 1867, Congress was anticipating Southern resis-
tance to Reconstruction and to the implementation of the post-war constitutional Amend-
ments.").
37 VICTOR E. FLANGO, HABEAS CoRPus IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 3-4 (1994)
(citation omitted). Congress amended the federal habeas corpus statutes in Act of Feb. 5, 1867,
ch. 28 § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86 (codified at28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1868)).
38 See DUKER, supra note 13, at 8 ("To effectuate federal policy ... federal habeas was
gradually extended to state cases.").
31 See Noia, 372 U.S. at 417 ("'This legislation is of the most comprehensive character. It
brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every possible
case of privation of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws. It is impossi-
ble to widen this jurisdiction."') (quoting Ex pane McCardle, 73 U.S. 318, 325-26 (1867)); id.
at 426 ("Congress in 1867 sought to provide a federal forum for state prisoners having constitu-
tional defenses by extending the habeas corpus powers of the federal courts to their constitu-
tional maximum.").
4o As Justice Brennan has explained:
'We may assume that Congress has constitutional power to provide that all federal
issues be tried in the federal courts, that all be tried in the courts of the States, or that
jurisdiction of such issues be shared. And in the exercise of that power, we may as-
sume that Congress is constitutionally fully free to establish the conditions under
which civil or criminal proceedings involving federal issues may be removed from
one court to another.'
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 106 n.8 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Greenwood
v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833 (1966)).
[Vol. 50:869
RAISING PROCEDURAL DEFAULT SUA SPONTE
in issue.' 41 Nonetheless, Congress in its wisdom selected "liberal
post-trial federal review [as] the [appropriate] redress" for federal
civil rights.4 2
B. New Limitations on the Writ: The Exhaustion Doctrine
Soon after Congress significantly expanded federal habeas cor-
pus jurisdiction, the Supreme Court introduced a new limitation on
federal habeas review known as the exhaustion doctrine.43 The Court
"was determined to resist the deterioration of federalism" and prevent
undue interference with the administration of state criminal proceed-
ings.44 As early as 1886, the Supreme Court in Ex parte Royal 45 de-
clined to grant the writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner before his
state trial. The Court held that even though a federal court retains ju-
risdiction to grant the writ to such a petitioner, as a matter of discre-
tion, the federal court should decline to do so until the state courts had
an opportunity to adjudicate the federal claims.46 The Court suggested
that a federal court's power to issue the writ of habeas corpus was in
part discretionary, and the decision to exercise that power should be
guided by the principle of comity.
47
The exhaustion doctrine, developed from Ex parte Royall, has
now been codified by Congress. It requires a state prisoner petitioning
for federal habeas corpus relief to exhaust all of his available state
court remedies before the federal writ can be granted.48 The purpose
41 Id. at 106 (footnote omitted).
42 Id.
43 See DUKER, supra note 13, at 8-9 ("To ensure the fine tuning of that balance [of state
and federal power] and to effectuate the goal of finality, the Court created the rule of exhaustion
and has employed that rule to obtain the desired mix of liberty, federal supremacy, and final-
ity.").
44 Brennan, supra note 22, at 427.45 117U.S. 241 (1886).
4 See id. at 250-51; see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,418 (1963) ('The [Royall] Court
held that even in [cases wherein habeas was sought in advance of trial] the federal courts had the
power to discharge a state prisoner restrained in violation of the Federal Constitution, but that
ordinarily the federal court should stay its hand on habeas pending completion of the state court
proceedings.") (citation omitted), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977).
47 See Royall, 117 U.S. at 251. As the Royall Court explained:
The injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon 'to dispose of the party as
law and justice require' does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and
mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it. That discretion should be
exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, be-
tween the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the
fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unneces-
sary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the
Constitution.
la.
48 See 28 U.S.C § 2254(b)(1)(A) (1999) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
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of this "exhaustion doctrine is principally . . . to protect the state
courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption
of state judicial proceedings. 49 State courts are charged equally with
federal courts with the duty of enforcing federal rights. ° Therefore, as
the Supreme Court has noted, "'it would be unseemly in our dual
system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court
conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a con-
stitutional violation."' 5  The principle of comity "teaches that one
court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction
until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and
already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass
upon the matter.
' 52
If a petitioner fails to exhaust his state remedies by not allowing
the state to adjudicate all of the petitioner's federal claims, the federal
habeas court should deny the application for the writ. The court
should do this "without prejudice to a renewal of the same after the
accused... avail[s] himself of such remedies as the laws of the State
afford[]. ' 3 From its very inception, the exhaustion rule for state
remedies has been one of timing only, so that states can remedy con-
stitutional violations before federal review is conducted.54 Therefore,
federal courts should dismiss without prejudice for failure to exhaust.
The exhaustion doctrine was never intended to do more than delay the
eventual vindication of federal rights.55
State...."); see also id. § 2254(c) ("An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the
right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.").
49 Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,518 (1982) (citation omitted).
50 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976) ("State courts, like federal courts,
have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law.")
(citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 341-44 (1816)).
51 Rose, 455 U.S. at 518 (quoting Darr v. Buford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)) (emphasis
added).
52 Id. (quoting Darr, 339 U.S. at 204).
5s3 Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S. 499, 500-01 (1901); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 419 (1963) (stating that the Court has "fashioned a doctrine of abstention, whereby full
play would be allowed the States in the administration of their criminal justice without prejudice
to federal rights enwoven in the state proceedings."), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
54 The Supreme Court has stated that:
The reasoning of Exparte Royall and its progeny suggested that after the state courts
had decided the federal question on the merits against the habeas petitioner, he could
return to the federal court on habeas and there reitigate the question, else a rule of
timing would become a rule circumscribing the power of the federal courts on ha-
beas, in defiance of unmistakable congressional intent.
Noia, 372 U.S. at 420.
55 See id. at 418 ("[The exhaustion doctrine] plainly stemmed from considerations of
comity rather than power, and envisaged only the postponement, not the relinquishment, of
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, which had attached by reason of the allegedly unconstitu-
tional detention and could not be ousted by what the state court might decide.").
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Since the creation of the exhaustion doctrine, the Court has con-
tinued to restrict the ease with which a state prisoner may receive fed-
eral habeas corpus relief.56 While some of the procedural hurdles
erected by the Court have the effect of denying federal habeas review,
they do not limit the jurisdiction of federal courts established by Con-
gress.57 Each new procedural requirement, like the requirement of
exhaustion, has been self-imposed, and originates in the discretion of
the Court.58
HI. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Given the exhaustion requirement and the federal courts' desire
to allow state courts to rule on federal claims, what is the effect on
subsequent federal review if a state court cannot, or will not, by its
own rules, consider the prisoner's federal claims? Consider the fol-
lowing situation. A state prisoner, following his conviction in state
court, files a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus without filing
for direct appellate review in the state courts. After initial examina-
tion of the state prisoner's petition, the federal court is informed that
the state prisoner has not yet exhausted his state remedies of appeal.
The federal court then dismisses the prisoner's petition without preju-
dice. The federal court also preserves the state prisoner's right to re-
file after exhausting his state court appeals. On the thirty-third day
after his conviction the state prisoner, having been delayed by the
aborted federal habeas corpus proceeding, files his state court appeal.
State procedural rules, however, require that the prisoner file an ap-
peal within thirty days after conviction. As a result of the prisoner's
failure to appeal within the specified time limit, his various claims,
both state and federal, are procedurally defaulted and will no longer
56 See FLANGO, supra note 37, at 6 ("The trend in recent years has been to restrict...
federal courts as a check on state courts.") (footnote omitted); 28 JAMES WM. MOORE Er AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 671.02 (3d ed. 1999) ("[O]ver the last twenty years or so, the
principle theme of habeas corpus jurisprudence has been the Court's creation and expansion of a
series of procedural hurdles ... all of which the petitioner must clear in order to have the federal
court address the substance of the alleged constitutional violation.").
57 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 505-06 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that considerations of comity and concern for the orderly administration of criminal justice are
not sufficient to allow the Court to rewrite jurisdictional statutes, because to do so would be an
arrogation of power committed solely to the Congress).
58 As the Supreme Court has explained:
Discretion is implicit in the statutory command that the judge, after granting the writ
... 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require;' and discretion was the flexible
concept employed by the federal courts in developing the exhaustion rule. Further-
more, habeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable prin-
ciples.
Noia, 372 U.S. at 438 (citations omitted); see also Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)
("Since habeas corpus is a discretionary writ, federal courts had authority to refuse relief as a
matter of comity until state remedies were exhausted.").
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be considered by the state court. Consequently, the state prisoner's
appeal is denied on state procedural grounds.
As demonstrated in the preceding example, a state prisoner's
failure to comply with state procedures, either in raising or preserving
a particular claim, may result in a procedural default which bars fu-
ture consideration of the claim on its merits.59 The majority of "[s]uch
defaults... involve traditional 'make it or waive it' defenses, such as
contemporaneous objection rules, in which appeals are forfeited if not
made in a timely fashion., 60 The purpose of enforcing procedural de-
faults through forfeiture of the underlying claim is the promotion of
orderly administration of state proceedings. 61 Although other penal-
ties might be envisioned, the severe nature of forfeiture is intended to
deter non-compliance with state procedural rules.62
If a state prisoner forfeits his federal claims in state court by
violating state procedural rules, an additional question arises as to
whether a federal court may nonetheless rule on the procedurally de-
faulted claims. In the context of federal habeas corpus review, as op-
posed to direct appellate review, the doctrine of exhaustion does not
59 Justice Brennan has observed:
State courts may deny a state prisoner relief from an unconstitutional conviction by
refusing to pass upon the prisoner's federal claims because of some failure to com-
ply with state procedures - for example, to file a timely appeal - or because of some
conduct of the prisoner deemed by the state courts to justify the denial of a hearing -
for example, the prisoner's escape from custody pending decision of his appeal in
the state courts.
Brennan, supra note 22, at 425; see also Ogletree, supra note 17, at 624 ("Procedural default
bars both frivolous and non-frivolous claims that were not raised or preserved properly in prior
judicial proceedings, thereby eliminating any prospect of adjudicating the claims on their merits
in a subsequent... proceeding.").
60 Dest, supra note 10, at 264.
61 See Ogletree, supra note 17, at 624 ("Procedural default rules are incorporated into
state and federal judicial systems to promote the efficient and orderly resolution of issues in
appellate and habeas corpus proceedings.") (footnote omitted). As another commentator has
stated:
[Procedural rules] serve critical purposes: the provision of adequate notice to adver-
saries (and the court) of the matters that are at issue; the allocation of decisions to
the appropriate body; the promotion of focused consideration of particular questions
at different times, when the pertinent evidence and argumentation can be mustered;
and the avoidance of wasteful proceedings by requiring prompt consideration of is-
sues upon whose resolution further matters (or the continuation of the proceeding at
all) depend. It is hard to imagine an effective procedural system lacking such rules
of the road.
Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1134-35.
62 One author has stated that:
Forfeiture provisions supply a necessary bite to... structural rules. A requirement
that a particular issue be raised in a particular fashion or at a particular time would
hardly be effective if failures to comply were never punished - especially if, as may
often be true, one adversary may find some strategic advantage in disregarding the
rule. Monetary fines could surely be imposed to induce compliance, but there is at
first glance a kind of poetic justice in forfeiting the very claim that was improperly
asserted.
Id. at 1135.
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operate as a bar. Technically, the exhaustion requirement has been
satisfied since no state remedies remain available. Therefore, if fed-
eral review is barred, it must be barred on some other ground.
A. The Effect of State Procedural Default on Direct Federal Review:
The Independent and Adequate State Ground Doctrine
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over state cases
is restricted by statute and the principle of federalism to those state
decisions that turn on federal law.64 For cases that turn on state law,
the state court's judgment must control.65 As a consequence of its
limited jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has developed the doctrine of
"independent and adequate state grounds." 66 This doctrine was origi-
nally expressed 67 in Murdock v. City of Memphis. 68 Later, in Fox Film
Corporation v. Miller,69 the Supreme Court held that "where the
judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is fed-
eral and the other non-federal in character, [Supreme Court] ... juris-
diction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal
ground and adequate to support the judgment."70 As originally con-
ceived, the doctrine "only applied to state substantive law, not to the
63 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991) ("A habeas petitioner who has
defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there
are no state remedies any longer 'available' to him.") (citations omitted).
64 Justice Brennan has stated that:
[The] principle of federalism is imbedded in the statutes governing direct review by
the Supreme Court of state court decisions. From the Judiciary Act of 1789 down to
the present statutes, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state cases has
been restricted to state decisions which necessarily turn on questions arising under
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
Brennan, supra note 22, at 434
65 See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 ("[Tjhis Court has no power to review a state law deter-
mination .... "); Brennan, supra note 22, at 435 ("[T]here seems no conceivable justification, in
the context of our federalism, for authorizing the Supreme Court... to have the final say on
pure state law questions ... ").
66 See Brennan, supra note 22, at 434 ("[The Supreme Court's] jurisdictional confinement
was explicit in ... the first Judiciary Act. Although a later amendment of the statute omitted the
express limitation, the Supreme Court nevertheless refused to overstep the jurisdictional
boundaries which had previously been delimited for it .... ") (footnotes omitted); id. at 436
("[Tihe adequate state ground rule is an interpretation of a statute delimiting [Supreme Court]
jurisdiction on direct review .... ).
67 See Dest, supra note 10, at 267 ("The independent and adequate state ground doctrine
originated in the landmark case of Murdock v. Memphis.") (footnote omitted).
6' 87 U.S. 590 (1874).
69 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
70 Id. at 210. The Supreme Court has also stated:
This Court will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the
decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal
question and adequate to support the judgment.... In the context of direct review of
a state court judgment, the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is juris-
dictional.
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 (citations omitted); see also Brennan, supra note 22, at 434 ("[S]tate-
court dispositions which rest, even though alternatively, upon adequate and independent state-
law grounds are impervious to any federal corrective process .... ").
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enforcement of state procedural rules." 71 Now, however, "[t]his rule
applies whether the state law ground is substantive or procedural. 72
Therefore, if a state court's judgment denying the appeal of a state
prisoner is based on an independent and adequate state ground,
namely, a procedural default for failure to comply with state proce-
dural law, the procedural default operates as a bar to direct review by
the Supreme Court.
The rule of "independent and adequate state grounds" is based
on the Court's ban on rendering advisory opinions.7 This ban origi-
nated during the presidency of George Washington when the Court
refused to answer questions from the Secretary of State Thomas Jef-
ferson regarding legal issues arising out of the war between England
and France.74 The Supreme Court noted "that it was constitutionally
forbidden to issue 'advisory opinions'-opinions on the constitution-
ality of legislative or executive actions that did not grow out of a case
or controversy., 75 In a state court decision resting alternatively on
federal grounds and an independent and adequate state ground, the
ban on rendering advisory opinions prevents the Supreme Court from
ruling on the federal questions which if alone would be properly
within its jurisdiction. Because the Supreme Court would be limited
to reversing and remanding the state court's ruling on the federal
ground, the power of the state court to reinstate its judgment based
entirely on the independent adequate state ground would render the
Supreme Court's ruling on federal law an advisory opinion.76 Conse-
71 Dest, supra note 10, at 267.
72 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 (citations omitted).
73 See Herb v. Pitcaim, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Brennan, supra note 22, at 434.
74 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNsTrutnoNAL LAw 90 (3d ed. 1996).
75 Id.
76 See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524 (1997) ('We in fact lack jurisdiction to
review such independently supported judgments on direct appeal: since the state-law determina-
tion is sufficient to sustain the decree, any opinion of this Court on the federal question would
be purely advisory.") (citations omitted); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 ("Because this Court has no
power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment, resolution
of any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would
therefore be advisory.") (citation omitted); Herb, 324 U.S. at 125-26 ('We are not permitted to
render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after
we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advi-
sory opinion."). Justice Brennan has also explained that:
[C]onsider for a moment just what were the drastic consequences which the Court
apprehended might follow if it should review directly a case from the state courts
whenever a 'federal question' purportedly was decided, even though side by side
with an independent state ground sufficient to support the disposition.... To sus-
tain Supreme Court jurisdiction under such circumstances would be to impale the
Court on the prongs of an excruciating dilemma. Is the Court to take the case simply
to pass on the federal question? It seems obvious that such a course could lead to
nothing more than reversal on the federal ground followed by remand to the state
court, which would then simply posit its decision squarely upon the state ground,
and reinstate its judgment. This course involves the Court in the rendition of advi-
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quently, when a state court judgment rests on an independent and
adequate state law ground such as a procedural default, direct review
by the Supreme Court is barred for lack of jurisdiction.
B. The Effect of State Procedural Default on Federal Habeas Corpus
Review
The effect of a state procedural default on federal habeas corpus
review is not as firmly established as the effect of such a default on
direct federal review. While the underlying habeas corpus statutes
have remained relatively uniform, 78 the Supreme Court has engaged
in a long debate of when, if ever, a state procedural default should
operate to bar federal habeas review.7 9 According to one commenta-
tor, the Supreme Court's treatment of procedural defaults "hardly
conform[s] to the tradition of giving stare decisis great weight in
matters of statutory interpretation," 80 and "this process of 'statutory
interpretation' looks very much like judicial lawmaking." 81 The Court
has even relied on the "historic willingness to overturn or modify its
earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where the statutory lan-
guage authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged., 82
Beyond its use as interesting background material, the signifi-
cance of this issue may not be immediately obvious within the context
of this Note. Although removed from the narrower question of
whether a federal court may raise the issue of procedural default sua
sponte, the Court's resolution of state procedural defaults, regardless
of how raised, is highly informative if not dispositive for the resolu-
tion of the narrower issue. If the Court holds, as it has in the past, that
a state procedural default should rarely operate to bar federal habeas
corpus review, then the narrower issue of raising procedural default
sory opinions - contrary to the clear purposes, if not the word, of the judicial article
of the Constitution.
Brennan, supra note 22, at 434 (footnote omitted).
77 See Dest, supra note 10, at 264 ("[Ihe Supreme Court has struggled to articulate a
substantive and consistent solution to the problem presented by the federal review of habeas
corpus claims that are defaulted in state court.").
78 See Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1166 ("The shifts in Supreme Court treatment of proce-
dural defaults have taken place notwithstanding continuity in the underlying statutory
scheme.").
79 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,399 (1963) ("The question has been much mooted under
what circumstances, if any, the failure of a state prisoner to comply with a state procedural
requirement, as a result of which the state courts decline to pass on the merits of his federal
defense, bars subsequent resort to the federal courts for relief on habeas corpus.") (footnote
omitted), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); id. at 411-12 ("We do
not suggest that this Court has always followed an unwavering line in its conclusions as to the
availability of the Great Writ. Our development of the law of federal habeas corpus has been
attended, seemingly, with some backing and filling.") (citations omitted).
80 Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1166 (footnote omitted).
"' Id. (footnote omitted).
82 Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 81.
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sua sponte is moot. Federal courts conducting habeas review would
have no incentive to search the state record for a procedural default if
the existence of a procedural default, no matter how it was discov-
ered, would not operate as a bar to federal review. While the debate
over the proper treatment of state procedural defaults is simply too
extensive for this Note, a summary of the arguments reveals that the
Court's current scheme of barring habeas review of procedurally de-
faulted claims is neither inevitable nor necessarily correct.
One of the many arguments against federal recognition of state
procedural defaults is the contention that broad federal review is a
necessary incentive to ensure that state courts vindicate federal
rights.83 Because states may be hostile to particular federal rights,
84
and because of the institutional constraints on direct Supreme Court
review,85 the threat of federal habeas corpus review serves as a pri-
mary source of protection for federal right-holders. Furthermore, be-
cause of the additional risks faced by the "guilty" when their federal
claims are reviewed by popularly elected state courts, 86 federal habeas
83 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 520 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("'[Tihe threat
of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the
land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional stan-
dards."') (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting));
id. at 521 ("The availability of collateral review assures 'that the lower federal and state courts
toe the constitutional line."') (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 264 (Harlan, J., dissenting)); id. ("The
primary justification given by the Court for extending the scope of habeas to all alleged consti-
tutional errors is that it provides a quasi-appellate review function, forcing trial and appellate
courts in both the federal and state system to toe the constitutional mark.") (quoting Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 685-87 (1971)); see also Brennan, supra note 22, at 442 ("The
state judiciaries, responsible equally with the federal courts to secure... [federal] rights, should
be encouraged to vindicate them. A self-fashioned abdication by the federal courts of their ha-
beas corpus jurisdiction in cases where state prisoners are denied state relief because of proce-
dural defaults would not provide that encouragement.").
84 See Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1136 ("In some cases, states may be hostile to particular
federal rights or rightholders. Moreover, deciding whether to forgive a default depends in large
part upon the importance assigned to the right in question; even absent any hostility to federal
rights, state courts or legislators may make value judgments that give federal rights inadequate
scope.") (footnote omitted).
85 See Powell, 428 U.S. at 526 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court does not, because it
cannot, dispute that institutional constraints totally preclude any possibility that this Court can
adequately oversee whether state courts have properly applied federal law, and does not contro-
vert the fact that federal habeas jurisdiction is partially designed to ameliorate that inade-
quacy.") (footnote omitted).
8 See id. at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Justice Brennan explained:
Enforcement of federal constitutional rights that redress constitutional violations di-
rected against the "guilty" is a particular function of federal habeas review, lest
judges trying the 'morally unworthy' be tempted not to execute the supreme law of
the land. State judges popularly elected may have difficulty resisting popular pres-
sures not experienced by federal judges given lifetime tenure designed to immunize
them from such influences, and the federal habeas statutes reflect the congressional
judgment that such detached federal review is a salutary safeguard against any de-
tention of an individual "in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United
States."
Id. (citation omitted).
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corpus review must be broad and free of the constraints of state pro-
cedural default.
Perhaps the most important consideration in deciding whether to
enforce state procedural defaults during federal habeas corpus review
involves the proper role of the 'independent and adequate state
ground' doctrine. Despite the fact that the doctrine originated from
the Supreme Court's interpretation of statutes limiting its direct ap-
pellate jurisdiction,87 some have argued that the doctrine should be
extended to collateral habeas corpus review in order to minimize con-
flicts between the state and federal judiciaries. 88 At the very least,
some have suggested that "we ought certainly to scrutinize carefully
the appropriateness of the adequate state ground rule as some would
now have it apply to federal habeas corpus," given that the doctrine is
supported by such significant policy justifications in the context of
direct review.
89
With respect to direct review, the "independent and adequate
state ground" doctrine prevents the Supreme Court from rendering an
advisory opinion. 90 The Supreme Court, when conducting direct ap-
pellate review of a state court judgment, has no other power than to
reverse the state's ruling on federal law and remand the case back to
the state court.91 Because the state, on the basis of the prisoner's pro-
cedural default, may render the same judgment regardless of the re-
versal on federal law, the Supreme Court's judgment would have no
effect and would be advisory.92 With respect to collateral habeas cor-
pus review, however, there is no danger of rendering an advisory
opinion. A federal court conducting habeas corpus review has the
power to order the state prisoner's release directly. This is the precise
power that the Supreme Court lacks on direct review, which creates
the risk of rendering an advisory opinion.93 Consequently, the same
87 See Brennan, supra note 22, at 435 ("It is of course immediately obvious that the ade-
quate state ground rule is nothing more than the Supreme Court's interpretation of a statute
having to do with Supreme Court review, and not with habeas corpus. Indeed, when Congress
amended the habeas corpus statute ... the restrictions upon the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
were not incorporated").
88 See id. ("[P]erhaps ... the problems of federal-state relationships which have been
inherent in the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction since 1867 ... suggest[ ] the extrapolation
from the field of direct Supreme Court review of a doctrine meant to minimize uncalled-for
intrusions by the federal judiciary into what ought to be exclusively state domains.").
69 Id. (footnote omitted).
90 See supra Part lA (discussing the "independent and adequate state ground" doctrine).
91 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
93 Justice Brennan has stated that:
MIhe fact that the adequate state ground rule is an interpretation of a statute delim-
iting jurisdiction on direct review will not necessarily disqualify it from service in
connection with federal habeas corpus, if the factors which make it seem so neces-
sary a limitation on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction are applicable with
anything like the same force to federal habeas corpus. Is there, then, any risk of a
federal district court's rendering an advisory opinion on a question of federal law if
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factor which makes the "independent and adequate state ground"
doctrine seem necessary on direct appeal does not apply to collateral
habeas corpus review.
On the basis of these arguments, among others,94 the Supreme
Court in Fay v. Noia95 rejected the notion that the 'independent and
adequate state ground' doctrine operated to bar habeas corpus review
of procedurally defaulted claims. Using the common balancing of
interests analysis,97 the Court in Noia clearly chose in favor of secur-
ing a federal forum for the vindication of constitutional rights rather
than securing the orderly administration of state criminal justice sys-
it orders a petitioner's release without purporting to decide any state-law question?
You will, I am certain, agree that an order having such consequences could never be
said to reflect an advisory opinion.... [Tihe Supreme Court, on direct review, can
only reverse the case and remand it to the state courts. It cannot secure the prisoner's
release directly, and it is from this deficiency in its power that the problem arises of
advisory opinion.... Since the federal habeas corpus court does not function under
any such limitation on its power, it is confronted by no such dilemma.
Brennan, supra note 22, at 436
94 TheNoia Court phrased the arguments as such:
[The measure that became the Act of 1867 seems plainly to have been designed to
furnish a method additional to and independent of direct Supreme Court review of
state court decisions for the vindication of the new constitutional guarantees. Con-
gress seems to have had no thought, thus, that a state prisoner should abide state
court determination of his constitutional defense - the necessary predicate of direct
review by this Court - before resorting to federal habeas corpus. Rather, a remedy
almost in the nature of removal from the state to the federal courts of state prisoners'
constitutional contentions seems to have been envisaged.
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977). The Court further stated that:
A man under conviction for crime has an obvious inducement to do his very best to
keep his state remedies open, and not stake his all on the outcome of a federal ha-
beas proceeding which, in many respects, may be less advantageous to him than a
state court proceeding. And if because of inadvertence or neglect he runs afoul of a
state procedural requirement, and thereby forfeits his state remedies, appellate and
collateral, as well as direct review thereof in this Court, those consequences should
be sufficient to vindicate the State's valid interest in orderly procedure. Whatever
residuum of state interest there may be under such circumstances is manifestly insuf-
ficient in the face of the federal policy, drawn from the ancient principles of the writ
of habeas corpus, embodied both in the Federal Constitution and in the habeas cor-
pus provisions of the Judicial Code, and consistently upheld by this Court, of af-
fording an effective remedy for restraints contrary to the Constitution.
Id. at 433-34 (citation omitted).
9- 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
96 The Noia Court explained:
[We reject as unsound in principle, as well as not supported by authority, the sug-
gestion that the federal courts are without power to grant habeas relief to an appli-
cant whose federal claims would not be heard on direct review in this Court because
of a procedural default furnishing an adequate and independent ground of state deci-
sion.
Id. at 434. The Court further held "that the jurisdiction of the federal courts on habeas corpus is
not affected by procedural defaults incurred by the applicant during the state court proceedings."
Id. at 438.
97 See supra note 10.
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tems. 8 The Court held that the exhaustion requirement applied only
to federal claims that could still be heard in a state court.9 If a par-
ticular claim could no longer be heard in state court because it was
procedurally defaulted, the federal court retained jurisdiction but pos-
sessed limited discretion to refuse to hear the claim. 1°° The narrow
circumstance within which a federal court could exercise its discre-
tion involved situations where the petitioner had deliberately by-
passed his state remedies before resorting to federal review. 10
Since Fay v. Noia, the Court has issued a series of decisions
eroding and eventually overruling the holding of that case. 0 2 In a
98 As the Court stated, "conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be
permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal
liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review."
Nola, 372 U.S. at 424. The Court further stated that although "orderly criminal procedure is a
desideratum, and of course there must be sanctions for the flouting of such procedure... that
state interest 'competes ... against... [the] ideal of fair procedure."' la. at 431 (quoting Walter
v. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1956)). The
Court further explained that:
It should be unnecessary to repeat what so often has been said and what so plainly is
the case: that the availability of the Great Writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts
for persons in the custody of the States offends no legitimate state interest in the en-
forcement of criminal justice or procedure. Our decision today swings open no
prison gates. Today as always few indeed is the number of state prisoners who
eventually win their freedom by means of federal habeas corpus. Those few who are
ultimately successful are persons whom society has grievously wronged and for
whom belated liberation is little enough compensation.
Id. at 44041 (footnote omitted). The Court also stated that "we have consistently held that
federal court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not
defeated by anything that may occur in the state court proceedings. State procedural rules
plainly must yield to this overriding federal policy." Id. at 426-27.
" See id. at 435 ("We hold that § 2254 is limited in its application to failure to exhaust
state remedies still open to the habeas applicant at the time he files his application in federal
court.") (footnote omitted).
100 See id. at 438 ("Although we hold that the jurisdiction of the federal courts on habeas
corpus is not affected by procedural defaults incurred by the applicant during the state court
proceedings, we recognize a limited discretion in the federal judge to deny relief to an applicant
under certain circumstances.").
101 See id. ("We therefore hold that the federal habeas judge may in his discretion deny
relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts
and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies.").
102 In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), the Court held that:
In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court
pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review
of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and
actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate
that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Fay was based on a conception of federal/state relations that undervalued the im-
portance of state procedural rules.... We now recognize the important interest in fi-
nality served by state procedural rules, and the significant harm to the States that re-
suits from the failure of federal courts to respect them.
Id. at 750 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977) (extending the "cause and prejudice" standard for excusing state procedural defaults to
state contemporaneous objection rules); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (extending
to state prisoners the rule that federal prisoners petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus must
show "cause and prejudice" for failing to challenge the composition of a grand jury before trial);
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dramatic shift, the Court, relying on the principles of federalism and
comity, 10 3 gave in to pressure from the states1°4 and "retreated from
... liberal application of the writ."105 While "Fay ... created a pre-
sumption in favor of federal habeas review of claims procedurally
defaulted in state court,"' 6 the Court now applies the "independent
and adequate state ground" doctrine to bar federal review in almost all
cases of procedural default.107 In place of the "deliberate bypass"
standard, which set out a narrow exception under which a federal
court would decline habeas review, the Court has instituted a "more
onerous standard"'0 8 of "cause and prejudice,"'1 9 which establishes
Dest, supra note 10, at 270 ("As soon as the Supreme court adopted the Fay rule, it began to
back away from it."); Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1146 ("[S]oon after Noia, the Supreme Court
began to reduce the gap between direct and collateral review.").
'03 See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730 ("In the habeas context, the application of the independ-
ent and adequate state ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism.");
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88 ("The contemporaneous-objection rle... deserves greater respect than
Fay gives it... for the fact that it is employed by a coordinate jurisdiction within the federal
system .... "); Francis, 425 U.S. at 542 ("'Plainly the interest in finality is the same with regard
to both federal and state prisoners.... There is no reason to... give greater preclusive effect to
procedural defaults by federal defendants than to similar defaults by state defendants. To hold
otherwise would reflect an anomalous and erroneous view of federal-state relations."') (quoting
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969)). As another commentator has observed:
The most startling difference between the Fay and Wainwright analyses lies in the
divergent ways the Supreme Court characterized and weighed the different sover-
eign interests involved in the case of a state procedurally defaulted habeas corpus
claim. In Fay, the importance of having a federal forum for the enforcement of fed-
eral rights trumped the reinforcement of state procedural rules.... In Wainivright,
however, the federal policy of ensuring the enforcement of federal rights in a federal
forum was outweighed by comity concerns attending collateral review by a coordi-
nate jurisdiction and by state interests, such as finality and reliability, thought to be
fostered by the rigid enforcement of state procedural rules.
Dest, supra note 10, at 272-73
104 See MOORE Er" AL., supra note 56, at § 671 App. 200[3] ("The relatively broad relief
which became available to habeas petitioners during the 1950's and 1960's almost instantly
became the subject of pressure from the states, which greatly resented the interference with their
administration of justice and the fact that a conviction which had been affirmed by the highest
court of a state could be reversed by a single federal judge. Considerations of federalism, com-
ity, and finality soon led to a restriction in the use of the writ to seek relief."). But see Brennan,
supra note 22, at 427 ("[1]t might 'appear unseemily that a prisoner, after conviction in a state
court, should be set at liberty by a single judge on habeas corpus .... ' But... after examining
the [habeas] statute ... 'there seems to be no escape from the law."' (quoting Exparte Bridges,
4 Fed. Cas. 98, 106 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No. 1862)).
105 Ogletree, supra note 17, at 625 (footnote omitted).
'o6 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 745.
107 See id. at 750 ("In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in
state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review
of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law .....
108 Ogletree, supra note 17, at 625.
109 In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), the Supreme Court stated:
[The existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the
prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded coun-
sel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule. Without attempting an ex-
haustive catalog of such objective impediments to compliance with a procedural
rule, we note that a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not rea-
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the narrow exception under which a federal court will ignore the pro-
cedural default and proceed with federal review.
Although some commentators have referred to Fay v. Noia as a
"notorious ... decision,"' 10 the "demise" of that opinion was not ac-
cepted without dissent.' Even the staunchest critics of Noia must
sonably available to counsel, or that some interference by officials made compliance
impracticable, would constitute cause under this standard.
Id. at 488 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Cf id. at 496 ("[1]n an extraordinary case,
where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause
for the procedural default."); see also 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 26.3b-c (2d ed. 1994) (discussing tests for cause
and prejudice, respectively).
110 Robert C. Post, Justice Brennan and Federalism, in FEDERALISM: STUDIES IN HISTORY,
LAW AND POLICY 37, 38 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1988).
.' In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), Justice Blackmun stated:
Federalism; comity; state sovereignty; preservation of state resources; certainty:
The majority methodically inventories these multifarious state interests .... One
searches the majority's opinion in vain, however, for any mention of petitioner
Coleman's right to a criminal proceeding free from constitutional defect or his inter-
est in finding a forum for his constitutional challenge to his conviction and sentence
of death.
Id. at 758 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He further stated that "the form of federalism embraced
by today's majority bears little resemblance to that adopted by the Framers of the Constitution
and ratified by the original States. The majority proceeds as if the sovereign interests of the
States and the Federal Government were coequal." Id. at 759. Justice Brennan has taken a
similar stance:
If the Court believes that Fay is no longer good law, and if the Court has the 'insti-
tutional duty' to develop and explicate the law in a reasoned and consistent manner,
then it has the duty to face squarely our prior cases interpreting the federal habeas
statutes and honestly state the reasons, if any, for its altered perceptions of federal
habeas jurisdiction. I, for one, do not relish the prospect of being informed several
Terms from now that the Court overruled Fay this Term .... I adhere to the holding
of Fay and our other precedents establishing that, absent a deliberate bypass of state
procedures, a procedural default cannot justify the withholding of habeas relief from
a state prisoner who was convicted in derogation of his constitutional rights; if the
Court no longer shares that view, it is evident that it has an 'institutional duty' to say
so forthrightly and to explain why some other standard is to be applied ....
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 547 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Justice Brennan further explained that:
I fail to comprehend how 'considerations of comity and federalism' - vague con-
cepts that are given no content by the Court - grant this Court the power to circum-
scribe the scope of congressionally intended relief for state prisoners .... Such
considerations, in our federal system in which the federal courts are the ultimate ar-
biters of federal constitutional rights, at most justify the postponement, not the abne-
gation, of federal jurisdiction.... The increasingly talismanic use of the phrase
'comity and federalism' itself essentially devoid of content.., has the look of an
excuse being fashioned by the Court for stripping federal courts of the jurisdiction
properly conferred by Congress.
Id. at 548-51. Another commentator, suggesting that the decision in Wainwright cannot be
justified on the basis of existing abstention principles, has stated:
mhe finality of state court litigation has been specifically undercut by the availabil-
ity of collateral federal review under the habeas corpus statute .... Hence, a state
does not have a legitimate governmental interest in the complete finality of its deci-
sions over habeas corpus claims. Since the state has no 'countervailing' interest that
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agree that given the Court's checkered past with the habeas statutes,
there is no guarantee that future Courts will not return to its previous
holding.' 1 2 Furthermore, "Congress, as the primary expositor of fed-
eral-court jurisdiction, remains free to undo the potential restrictive-
ness" 113 of Noia's successors.
In truth, a significant portion of the Noia decision, at least for the
purposes of this Note, survives. Fay v. Noia's broad holding that the
"independent and adequate state ground" rule does not apply to col-
lateral habeas corpus review has been overruled. Nonetheless, the
overruling cases acknowledge that the doctrine of "independent and
adequate state grounds" is not jurisdictional with respect to habeas
review. 1 4 On the issue of raising procedural default sua sponte, this
concession to the rule of Fay v. Noia is of great significance.
The basic rule of the Supreme Court (and courts in general) is
that issues not raised, or not properly raised, by the parties will not be
raised for the first time by the Court.! 5 The primary exception to this
rule involves issues that affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
Court. 16 For issues such as these, the very power of the Court to re-
would be fostered by the declination of federal jurisdiction in cases of state proce-
dural default, the federal courts should not abstain from hearing such claims.
Dest, supra note 10, at 293-94 (footnote omitted); see also Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1166
n.178 ("Even those critical of Noia have suggested that it is odd to foreclose a defendant from
raising an issue collaterally if, had he complied with appropriate state procedures, the result
would not have been a conclusive state court resolution of the issue, but rather 'a prelude to
dispositive federal adjudication."') (quoting P. BATOR et al., HART & WECHSLER'S TIE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1486 (2d ed. 1973)).
112 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
1' Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 101 n.2 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114 The Supreme Court has stated that:
The "independent and adequate state ground" doctrine is not technically jurisdic-
tional when a federal court considers a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus...
since the federal court is not formally reviewing ajudgment.... Application of the
"independent and adequate state ground" doctrine to federal habeas review is based
upon equitable considerations of federalism and comity.
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997). The Court has further declared:
In the context of direct review of a state court judgment, the independent and ade-
quate state ground doctrine is jurisdictional .... The basis for application of the in-
dependent and adequate state ground doctrine in federal habeas is somewhat differ-
ent than on direct review by this Court. ... In the habeas context, the application of
the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of com-
ity and federalism.
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. But see LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 109, at 812-13 (suggest-
ing that the "independent and adequate state ground" doctrine should be jurisdictional with
respect to both direct and habeas review).
115 See Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Generally, where the
parties have not raised a defense, the court should not address the defense sua sponte."); Ernest
H. Schopler, Annotation, What Issues Will The Supreme Court Consider, Though Not, or Not
Properly, Raised by the Parties, 42 L. Ed. 2d 946, 949 (1976) (illustrating the general rule of the
Supreme Court to not raise issues not already raised by the parties).
116 See Schopler, supra note 115, at 950 ("The most important issues considered by the
court as an exception to the ordinary rule concern questions of federal subject-matter jurisdic-
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solve the parties' dispute is called into question and the Court, if it is
aware of the issue, must address it whether or not it is raised by the
parties. 17 As a consequence of the now generally accepted position
"that in the habeas context, procedural default... is not a jurisdic-
tional matter,"" 8 the Court in Trest v. Cain1' 9 correctly held that "[a]
court... is not 'required' to raise the issue of procedural default sua
sponte."'20 Therefore, the last surviving vestiges of Noia serve, at
least, to keep open the question of raising procedural default sua
sponte.
But how does the Court's treatment of state procedural defaults,
no matter how they are raised, affect the question of whether a federal
court may raise the issue of procedural default sua sponte? Under the
Court's "deliberate bypass" standard, the opportunities for a federal
court to raise the defense of procedural default sua sponte would be
very rare. In the majority of cases, the state procedural default would
result from inadvertence or neglect on the part of the defendant or his
attorney' 21 and the default no matter how it was raised would not op-
erate as a forfeiture of the defendant's federal claims. Even on the
rare occasion where the defendant had deliberately bypassed his state
remedies, the same balancing of interests that created the "deliberate
bypass" standard would counsel against raising the state defense of
procedural default sua sponte. In light of the Noia Court's deep admi-
ration and respect for the role of the writ of habeas corpus in our fed-
eral scheme, it would be an affront to the history and purpose of the
writ for the Court to defeat by its own efforts a state petitioner's po-
tentially meritorious federal claims.
Conversely, the "demise" of Noia, while it does call into ques-
tion the extent to which the Court's esteem for the writ has fallen,
does not particularly address the issue of whether a state procedural
default can be raised sua sponte. Although federal courts will now
decline habeas corpus review on the basis of concerns for comity and
federalism, the further question that remains to be answered is
whether comity and federalism are independent federal interests
tion, whether it is the Supreme Court's own jurisdiction or that of the courts below.") (citation
omitted).
117 See id. § 4 (citations omitted).
'8 Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997).
"' 522 U.S. 87 (1997).
12 Id.
121 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 104 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A]ny
realistic system of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction must be premised on the reality that the
ordinary procedural default is born of the inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompe-
tence of trial counsel.") (citation omitted); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 433 (1963) ("A man
under conviction for crime has an obvious inducement to do his very best to keep his state
remedies open, and not stake his all on the outcome of a federal habeas proceeding which, in
many respects, may be less advantageous to him than a state court proceeding.") (citation omit-
ted).
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which federal courts should raise on their own. For those who are per-
suaded by the holding of Noia and subscribe to the "greatness" of the
writ of habeas corpus, the issue of raising procedural default sua
sponte is all but foreclosed. For those who agree that Noia was a
"notorious... decision,"' 22 the question of raising procedural default
sua sponte remains open.
Ill. RAISING PROCEDURAL DEFAULT SUA SPONTE: OPINIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL
When a state prisoner petitions for a federal writ of habeas cor-
pus, it is generally in the best interest of the State, seeking to bar re-
lease, to raise any defenses that are available to it. Because the issue
of procedural default, at least with respect to habeas corpus, is not a
jurisdictional matter,123 the State must rely on procedural default as an
affirmative defense.124 Occasionally, a State will expressly waive a
defense such as procedural default or will waive it by inadvertently
failing to raise it.125 In these situations, a federal court may be
tempted to raise the defense on its own. Before doing so, however, the
federal court must determine whether it is permitted under the cir-
cumstances to raise procedural default sua sponte.
Many circuits, though not all, have ruled expressly on the issue
of raising procedural default sua sponte. Among these circuits, all
hold that federal courts possess discretion 126 to invoke procedural de-
fault sua sponte. However, there is no uniformity in reasoning among
the circuits and, more importantly, there is significant disagreement
regarding when the court's discretion is properly exercised.
Some circuits, as justification for raising procedural default sua
sponte, rely on the fact that federal courts may raise the requirement
122 Post, supra note 110, at 38.
123 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
'24 See Trest, 522 U.S. at 89 ("[P]rocedural default is normally a 'defense' that the State is
'obligated to raise' and 'preserv[e]' if it is not to 'lose the right to assert the defense thereaf-
ter."') (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 165-66 (1996)).
125 See Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515, 1524 n.32 (1 th Cir. 1995) ('Tle state can waive
a procedural bar to relief by explicitly waiving, or by merely failing to assert, the bar in its an-
swer to the habeas petition.").
126 The introduction of the notion of discretion turns what was one question into two. First
of all, is a federal court, conducting habeas corpus review of a state prisoner's conviction, per-
mitted to raise the state's defense of procedural default sua sponte? According to the majority
of Circuits, the answer is yes - federal habeas courts possess discretion to invoke procedural
default sua sponte. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text. Secondly, when, if ever,
should a federal habeas court exercise its discretion? The separation of these issues does not
alter the nature of the arguments against raising procedural default sua sponte; it only changes
the focus of those arguments. One might easily concede that federal courts possess discretion to
raise procedural default sua sponte and yet as a matter of policy conclude that the courts should
never exercise that discretion.
[Vol. 50:869
RAISING PROCEDURAL DEFAULT SUA SPONTE
of exhaustion sua sponte.127 In spite of arguments to the contrary, 128
these circuits hold that "there is no substantial difference between
nonexhaustion and procedural default., 129 Some circuits rely addi-
tionally, or in the alternative, on Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Sec-
tion 2254 Cases in the United State District Courts. 130 According to
these circuits, "[t]his rule empowers the court to dismiss meritless
petitions on its own without requiring any action by the govern-
ment." 131 Still other circuits note as significant an exception to the
general prohibition against raising defenses sua sponte "where a
'doctrine implicates [nonjurisdictional] values that may transcend the
concerns of the parties to an action. '"1 32 According to these circuits,
"the state procedural default doctrine substantially implicates impor-
tant values that transcend the concerns of the parties to an action. The
doctrine is grounded upon concerns of comity between sovereigns
and often upon considerations of judicial efficiency.' ' 133 Conse-
quently, "it is not exclusively within the parties' control to decide
whether such a defense should be raised or waived. ' 134
127 See, e.g., Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 357 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Some... circuits
have expressly relied upon the similarity between exhaustion and procedural default to hold that
a federal court may exercise its discretion to raise procedural default sua sponte.") (citing
Washington v. James, 996 F.2d 1442, 1448 (2d Cir. 1993); Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d
500,504 (10th Cir. 1992); Hull v. Freeman, 932 F.2d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 1991)).
128 See infra Part V (refuting the argument that the ability of the federal courts to raise
exhaustion requirements sua sponte furnishes a justification for allowing the courts to raise
procedural default sua sponte).
:29 Magouirk, 144 F.3d at 358.
30 See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, Rule 4. The rule
states that:
If it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an dr-
der for its summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be notified. Otherwise the
judge shall order the respondent to file an answer or other pleading within the period
of time fixed by the court or to take such other action as the judge deems appropri-
ate.
28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254 (1994); see also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (9th Cir.
1998) (suggesting that Rule 4 demonstrates Congress' intent that district courts take a more
active role in disposing of defective habeas petitions); Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 504 ("Rule 4...
indicates that Congress intended the courts to play a more active role in § 2254 cases than they
generally play in many other kinds of cases.").
131 Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 504. But see infra Part VII (arguing that Rule 4 does not con-
template raising procedural default sua sponte).
112 Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 502-03; see also Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255, 261 (4th
Cir. 1999) ("[In the presence of overriding interests of comity and judicial efficiency that tran-
scend the interests of the parties, a federal habeas court may, in its discretion, deny federal ha-
beas relief on the basis of issues that were not preserved or presented properly by a state.")
(citation omitted); Schopler, supra note 115, § 12 ("[Ihe Supreme Court has made, in view of
the importance of the question involved or of public concern or in the interest of justice, an
exception to its rule against consideration of questions not raised by the parties.").
' Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 503 (citation omitted). But see infra Parts V-VI (discussing the
lack of legitimate independent federal interests that would necessitate raising procedural default
sua sponte).
"4 Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 503 (citation omitted).
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Although the majority of circuits, for various reasons, agree that
federal courts possess discretion to raise the defense of procedural
default sua sponte, the critical difference among the majority exists
with respect to when, and under what circumstances, a court's discre-
tion may be properly exercised. 135 According to one circuit, regardless
of whether a State has waived its defense of procedural default ex-
pressly or inadvertently, the federal court may possess independent
interests of its own that would permit it to invoke the defense sua
sponte.136 Other circuits hold that a federal court may raise procedural
default sua sponte only if the State has waived the defense inadver-
tently, but not if the State has waived the defense expressly. 37 To the
contrary, at least one circuit has suggested that procedural default
may not be raised sua sponte when the State has not, in any prior pro-
ceeding, relied on that defense; the most frequent example is an inad-
vertent waiver by the State.
138
Even though they cannot agree on the justifications for raising
procedural default sua sponte or the circumstances under which a
federal court should exercise its discretion to raise procedural default,
the circuits do seem to agree on the fact that all other circuits permit
sua sponte invocation of procedural default. According to the Ninth
Circuit, "[e]very circuit to consider the issue holds that a habeas court
has discretion to raise procedural default sua sponte to further the in-
135 See Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348,358 (5th Cir. 1998) ('The First, Second, Third,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have all recognized that a federal court may, in the
exercise of its judicial discretion, raise procedural default sua sponte in a habeas case.... [Tihe
Circuits vary [however] with respect to when that discretion may be appropriately exercised.")
(footnote omitted).
"4 See Hardiman, 971 F.2d at 503 ("Strong federal interests may exist that, balanced
against those of the state in the particular case, will permit the district court in its discretion to
decline a waiver [of a comity-based defense].") (quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d
1495, 1509 (1lth Cir. 1983)). Note, however, that the court in Thompson v. Wainwright held
that a district court in its discretion could decline a state's waiver of exhaustion. See Thompson,
714 F.2d at 1501. In fact, the federal court does possess independent interests that can be satis-
fied by requiring state exhaustion. However, those same federal court interests are not satisfied
by honoring a state procedural default. See infra Part V.
137 See, e.g., Magouirk, 144 F.3d at 359 ("Where omission is the result of a purposeful or
deliberate decision to forgo the defense, the district court should, in the typical case, presume
that waiver to be valid.") (citation omitted); Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515, 1527-28 (11th
Cir. 1995) ('The court's sua sponte invocation of the procedural default to bar relief, despite the
State's waiver, served no important federal interest.... Accordingly, when, as here, the state
waives a habeas petitioner's procedural default in failing to obtain appellate review of a claim,
the district court should assume that the waiver is justified."); Henderson v. Thieret, 859 F.2d
492, 498 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[A]lthough a district court is permitted... to consider a waive[d]
defense belatedly raised by the state, even to raise that defense sua sponte, the court is not per-
mitted to override the state's decision implicit or explicit.., to forego that defense.").
131 See Smith v. Hom, 120 F.3d 400, 409 (3d Cir. 1997) ("With regard to both nonexhaus-
tion and procedural default ... when the state has never raised an issue in either the district
court or this Court we should be even less inclined to raise it sua sponte than when the state
either has raised the issue... only belatedly or has raised it in the district court but has not
pursued that line of attack in the court of appeals.").
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terests of comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency." 139 According to
the Fifth Circuit, "[t]he First, Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits have all recognized that a federal court may, in
the exercise of its judicial discretion, raise procedural default sua
sponte in a habeas case. . . .[N]one of the federal Circuits ha[ve]
taken a contrary position." 14° Likewise, the Fourth Circuit recently
stated that "[t]he First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits all agree that a federal court, in the exercise of
its judicial discretion, may address procedural default despite the fail-
ure of the state to preserve or present the issue properly."'1
Each new circuit to join the ranks of the majority has been em-
boldened by and has relied at least in part on the perceived unanimity
of the other circuits that have ruled on the issue. As previously dis-
cussed, however, many of the circuits have adopted incompatible po-
sitions on the critical issue of when a federal court may properly exer-
cise its discretion.142 Consequently, in any given situation, it is likely
that at least one circuit has held that procedural default may not be
invoked sua sponte in that situation. Furthermore, at least one other
circuit, though never cited, has also raised serious doubt concerning
the propriety of raising procedural default sua sponte.
In Euell v. Wyrick,143 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
viewed the denial of David Euell's petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Euell, who had been convicted in
the state of Missouri for second-degree murder, raised an objection to
the jury selection process at his trial for the first time after his convic-
tion.144 Although objections regarding jury selection must be made
contemporaneously or are thereafter waived, "the state court [con-
ducting post-conviction review] apparently considered and denied
Euell's jury-selection claim despite the lack of contemporaneous ob-
jection. After exhausting his available state remedies, 4 6 "Euell
next turned to the federal courts for relief"'147 by filing a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Despite the fact that neither the state courts
below nor the counsel for the state had relied upon the petitioner's
failure to properly preserve his jury-selection claim at trial, 148 "It]he
139 Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing cases from the First,
Second, Third, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
'4o Magouirk, 144 F.3d at 358 (citations omitted).
141 Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255, 261-62 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
142 See supra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
141 675 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1982).
'44 See id. at 1007-08.141 Id. at 1009.
14' See id. at 1008 ("No state-court remedy remains available to petitioner.").
147 Id.
148 See id. at 1009 ("The court's order is brief and somewhat cryptic, but one thing is clear:
it does not explicitly mention any failure on the part of petitioner's trial counsel to make a con-
temporaneous objection. Nor, so far as the record before us indicates, did counsel for the State
20001
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
District Court declined to reach the merits of the jury-selection claim,
holding that... Euell was barred from raising the claim by his failure
to move to quash the jury panel at the time of his trial."'149
The opinion of the Eighth Circuit is not clear as to whether the
State or the district court ultimately raised the defense of procedural
default on habeas corpus, but the court's holding is broad enough to
make clear that the federal court may not raise the defense of proce-
dural default sua sponte under the facts of the case. The court held
that "[t]he federal court's task is not to apply state procedural rules as
though it stood in the state court's shoes, but rather to determine
whether the state courts relied on adequate state grounds to dismiss
the claim now being asserted in the federal court."' 50 Furthermore,
"[w]here a potential state procedural bar was raised neither by the
parties nor by the courts in the state-court proceedings, it should not
be raised for the first time to oppose a claim in federal habeas cor-
pus.'
5 1
While the primary holding of the case is that a procedural default
which is not relied upon in the state courts below may not subse-
quently be relied upon in the federal courts, a consequence of the
court's broad language is that a federal court may not raise procedural
default sua sponte where the parties have not seen fit to do so. 152 The
Euell Court made no distinction with respect to the parties or the fed-
eral court when it commanded that a procedural default should not be
raised on habeas review if not previously relied on in state court. In
addition, the implication is clear that federal courts should have a
preference towards conducting habeas review rather than avoiding it
because "[t]he federal court's task is not to apR state procedural
rules as though it stood in the state court's shoes."
Admittedly, the facts of Euell potentially limit the scope of its
holding, a factor that may bear some relation to the fact that it is ig-
nored by the majority of circuits. However, upon closer review, Euell
may have broader application than its facts reveal. Implicit in the
Euell holding was the command that a federal court not raise the de-
fense of procedural default sua sponte when the State, though given
an opportunity to rely on the procedural default, never did so. Given
ask that petitioner's jury-selection claim be dismissed because it had not been properly pre-
served at trial.") (footnote omitted).
149 Id. at 1008.
o Id.
m Id. at 1009.
152 See Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 409 (3d Cir. 1997) ("With regard to both nonexhaus-
tion and procedural default ... when the state has never raised an issue in either the district
court or this Court we should be even less inclined to raise it sua sponte than when the state
either has raised the issue here only belatedly or has raised it in the district court but has not
pursued that line of attack in the court of appeals.") (citation omitted).
'53 Euell, 675 F.2d at 1008.
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the State's obvious incentive to enforce its own procedural rules and
to dispose of matters in the most efficient manner possible, rarely will
the State, when given an opportunity, fail to rely on the procedural
default as a bar to consideration on the merits.
Euell demonstrates a rare exception to the general practice. In
Euell, the petitioner presented his federal claims to the state court,
though belatedly, and the State, through its courts, was directly pre-
sented with an opportunity to rely upon the petitioner's procedural
default as a basis for denying relief. Instead of doing so, however, the
State court ignored the procedural default and ruled on the merits of
the petitioner's claims. In this sense, the facts of Euell are a rarity and
the extent of its holding is arguably limited. However, there is at least
one other significant situation that might fall under the holding of
Euell, where the State, though given an opportunity, never relies on
the procedural default.
When a state prisoner petitions for a federal writ of habeas cor-
pus after inadvertently failing to present his federal claims in the state
courts and after procedural default has occurred, the state courts be-
low are never presented directly with an opportunity, as in Euell, to
rely on the procedural default. 1 4 Instead, the only opportunity for the
State to address the procedural default is to raise it as an affirmative
defense in its answer to the petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
Therefore, in this situation, like the one in Euell, the State is presented
with an opportunity to raise and rely on the procedural default, though
admittedly there is a much higher risk of failing to raise it inadver-
tently.
It is not an unreasonable interpretation of the Euell holding to
suggest that the same rule against raising procedural default sua
sponte applies whether the State fails to rely on the procedural default
in the state courts below or, in the alternative, fails to rely on the de-
fault in its answer to the petition when there are no state court pro-
ceedings below. In both situations it would be equally true that "[t]he
federal court's task is not to apply state procedural rules as though it
stood in the state court's shoes. 155 Likewise, "[w]here a potential
state procedural bar was raised neither by the parties nor by the courts
l-4 Although the state courts were never given an opportunity to pass on the federal claims
in such a scenario, the relevant issue is not exhaustion since technically the state remedies have
been defaulted and are no longer available. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732
(1991) ("A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the tech-
nical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer 'available' to him.")
(citations omitted); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1989) ("[A] federal habeas court
need not require that a federal claim be presented to a state court if its is clear that the state court
would hold the claim procedurally barred.") (citations omitted). Therefore, federal courts in this
situation are not presented with the question of raising the exhaustion requirement sua sponte
but are still confronted with the issue of raising procedural default sua sponte.
"- Euell, 675 F.2d at 1008.
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... it should not be raised for the first time to oppose a claim in fed-
eral habeas corpus."'
56
IV. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST FINDING INDEPENDENT AND
ADEQUATE STATE GROUNDS
Even when state counsel properly raises a defense of procedural
default in its answer to a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, federal habeas corpus review is not necessarily barred. As the
Supreme Court has explained, "[sltate procedural bars are not im-
mortal... they may expire because of later actions by state courts. If
the last state court to be presented with a particular federal claim
reaches the merits, it removes any bar to federal-court review that
might otherwise have been available., 157 As such, "the mere fact that
a federal claimant failed to abide by a state procedural rule does not,
in and of itself, prevent [federal courts] from reaching the federal
claim: '[T]he state court must actually have relied on the procedural
bar as an independent basis for its disposition. '"1 58 Given, however,
the multitude of issues that are often addressed by state courts at each
successive level of a criminal prosecution, and the possible use of
"unexplained order[s] ... whose text or accompanying opinion does
not disclose the reason for the judgment," 5 9 it is often a difficult task
for federal courts to find actual reliance by the state courts on any
individual claim.
When a federal court conducts direct appellate review of a state
court judgment, the "independent and adequate state ground" doc-
trine, whether it applies to substantive or procedural state grounds,1
60
is a jurisdictional matter.16 1 Therefore, the presence of an "independ-
ent and adequate state ground" is a matter of immediate consequence
on direct review. Because state courts must often address overlapping
156 Id. at 1009.
157 Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (citation omitted).
151 Harris, 489 U.S. at 261 (1989) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327
(1985)).
159 Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 802.
160 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,729 (1991) (stating that the "independent and
adequate state ground" doctrine "applies whether the state law ground is substantive or proce-
dural") (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207,210 (1935)); Harris, 489 U.S. at 260-61
("Although [the 'independent and adequate state ground' doctrine] originated in the context of
state-court judgments for which the alternative state and federal grounds were both 'substantive'
in nature, the doctrine 'has been applied routinely to state decisions forfeiting federal claims for
violation of state procedural rules."') (quoting Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1134).
161 See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729 ("In the context of direct review of a state court judg-
ment, the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is jurisdictional."); Harris, 489 U.S.
at 260 ('This Court long has held that it will not consider an issue of federal law on direct re-
view from a judgment of a state court if that judgment rests on a state-law ground that is both
'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's deci-
sion.") (citing Fox Film Corp., 296 U.S. at 210; Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590
(1875)).
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state and federal issues, federal courts on appeal may be uncertain
whether the previous state decision rested primarily on state or federal
law.162 In order to resolve these common ambiguities, federal courts
on direct review rely upon a conclusive presumption: 163 as long as the
state court decision reasonably appears to be based on federal law,
the federal court retains jurisdiction to review the federal question on
direct appeal unless the state court by a clear plain statement indi-
cates that its decision rests on an independent and adequate state
ground. 164
When federal courts conduct habeas corpus collateral review, the
same problems of ambiguity often arise. 165 Under the rule of Noia,
such ambiguities caused little difficulty because the "independent and
adequate state ground" doctrine simply did not apply to federal ha-
beas review. 66 Even if the state courts had rested their decisions upon
an independent and adequate state ground, provided that a legitimate
federal issue existed, the federal court retained jurisdiction and was
expected to conduct collateral review subject only to the "deliberate
bypass" rule. Once the "independent and adequate state ground" doc-
trine was expanded to federal habeas review on the basis of comity
and concerns of federalism, the same presumption that applied on
direct federal review to clear up ambiguities was also extended to ha-
beas review. 167 If the last state court to issue a reasoned decision
68
162 As the Supreme Court has stated:
It is not always easy for a federal court to apply the independent and adequate state
ground doctrine. State court opinions will, at times, discuss federal questions at
length and mention a state law basis for decision only briefly. In such cases, it is
often difficult to determine if the state law discussion is truly an independent basis
for decision or merely a passing reference.
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732; see also Harris, 489 U.S. at 261 ('The question whether a state
court's reference to state law constitutes an adequate and independent state ground for its judg-
ment may be rendered difficult by ambiguity in the state court's opinion.").
163 See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 ("In Michigan v. Long, we provided a partial solution to
this problem in the form of a conclusive presumption.") (citation omitted).
164 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) ('[When... a state court deci-
sion fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and
when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face
of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the
case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.").
165 See Harris, 489 U.S. at 262 ("The adequate and independent state ground doctrine, and
the problem of ambiguity resolved by Long, is of concern not only in cases on direct review...
but also in federal habeas corpus proceedings.").
"6 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
67 See Harris, 489 U.S. at 265 ("Having extended the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine to habeas cases, we now extend to habeas review the 'plain statement' rule for
determining whether a state court has relied on an adequate and independent state ground.").
168 The Supreme Court has stated that:
As applied to an unexplained order leaving in effect a decision.., that expressly re-
lies upon procedural bar, the Harris presumption would interpret the order as re-
jecting that bar and deciding the federal question on the merits. That is simply a
most improbable assessment of what actually occurred.
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991).
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fairly appeared to base its decision on federal law or an interwoven
mix of state and federal law, then a federal habeas court should pre-
sume that the "independent and adequate state ground" doctrine does
not bar federal review absent a plain statement by the state court to
the contrary. 169
If the existence of this presumption against finding an "inde-
pendent and adequate state ground" does not resolve the issue of
raising procedural default sua sponte,170 it at least suggests a proper
resolution. The purpose of the presumption-to serve in ambiguous
situations as a tiebreaker in favor of federal review-reveals the
proper frame of mind for a federal court when determining whether or
not it should review a state court conviction. If the state courts below
do not make clear their reliance on procedural default the federal
court should presume that procedural default is not an independent
and adequate state ground barring federal review. Rather, federal
courts should be of the mind that no independent and adequate state
ground exists absent compelling reasons to the contrary.
Arguably, the same presumption should apply when a federal
court reviews the State's answer to a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus. If the State in its answer addresses the merits of a petitioner's
claims, as it inevitably would in the situation where it inadvertently
fails to raise the procedural default defense, the federal court should
have the mind set that no independent and adequate state ground bars
its review. A federal court that is directed to presume, under specified
169 As explained by the Supreme Court:
After Harris, federal courts on habeas corpus review of state prisoner claims, like
this Court on direct review of state court judgments, will presume that there is no in-
dependent and adequate state ground for a state court decision when the decision
'fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal
law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is
not clear from the face of the opinion .... ' In habeas, if the decision of the last state
court to which the petitioner presented his federal claims fairly appeared to rest pri-
marily on resolution of those claims .... and did not clearly and expressly rely on an
independent and adequate state ground, a federal court may address the petition.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 734-35 (1991) (citation omitted).
170 The Coleman Court pronounced that:
This [presumption] does not apply if the petitioner failed to e haust state remedies
and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order
to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.
In such a case there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas regardless
of the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner actually presented his
claims.
Id. at 735 n.1. Consequently, Coleman recognizes that the presumption against finding an "in-
dependent and adequate state ground" does not apply to the situation where a petitioner first
presents his defaulted claims directly to the federal court. Where state counsel in its answer
addresses the existence of a procedural default, the federal court will not presume that the state
courts below addressed the merits of the petitioner's claim and ignored the procedural default
when in fact the petitioner's federal claims were never presented to the state courts below. But
see supra Part M (discussing application of the holding in Euell to the situation where neither
the state courts below nor the state counsel in its answer address the procedural default).
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conditions, that no independent and adequate state ground exists,
should not consider itself free to raise procedural default (an inde-
pendent and adequate state ground) sua sponte.
V. RAISING THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT SUA SPONTE
The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen the State answers a
habeas corpus petition, it has a duty to advise the district court
whether the prisoner has, in fact, exhausted all available state reme-
dies.' 171 Occasionally, however, the State will waive the defense of
nonexhaustion either expressly or by inadvertently failing to raise
it.172 In these situations, the Supreme Court has made clear that fed-
eral courts are permitted to raise the requirement of exhaustion sua
sponte.173 On the basis of this rule, several circuits likewise permit
federal courts to raise the defense of procedural default sua sponte.174
The validity of this practice, however, is not uniformly accepted. 175
The rule permitting federal courts to raise the requirement of
exhaustion sua sponte, even in spite of an express waiver by the
State, 176 is a rule that is supported by legitimate interests of the federal
courts. 177 By requiring a petitioner to exhaust his state court remedies,
the federal habeas court may avoid future involvement altogether if
the state courts below grant the relief that was sought initially in the
federal court.178 Otherwise, if relief in state court is denied and the
171 Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987) (citation omitted); see also Rules Gov-
erning § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254
(1994) ("[The answer] shall state whether the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies.").
172 See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134 ("[T]here are exceptional cases in which the State fails,
whether inadvertently or otherwise, to raise an arguably meritorious nonexhaustion defense.").
173 See id. at 136 (holding that when the state has failed to raise the nonexhaustion defense,
the federal court should exercise discretion in each case to determine whether the interests of
comity and justice are better served by addressing the merits immediately or by requiring com-
plete exhaustion).
174 See Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 357 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Some... circuits have
expressly relied upon the similarity between exhaustion and procedural default to hold that a
federal court may exercise its discretion to raise procedural default sua sponte.") (citation omit-
ted); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 109, at 816 n.2 ("Relying on Granberry or on a like analy-
sis, a number of decisions conclude that a federal court has the power to raise a procedural de-
fault sua sponte even if the state fails to assert the default in a timely fashion.") (citations omit-
ted).
175 See id at 817 n.2 (stating that "[t]he validity of denying federal consideration and relief
on the basis of forfeited claims of a procedural default is in doubt") (citation omitted).
176 See 29 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACriCE § 671.0614] (3d ed.
1999) ("It [is] generally accepted that the habeas court [is] not required to accept a waiver and
[can] consider the exhaustion issue even over the state's objection.").
177 See Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Strong federal
interests may exist that, balanced against those of the state in the particular case, will permit the
district court in its discretion to decline a waiver and require state exhaustion.").
178 See id. ( When state courts initially address requests for collateral relief some cases will
never reach the federal courts, for the state courts will recognize constitutional violations and
grant relief."); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 109, at 817 n.2 (suggesting that exhaustion in
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federal court is required to conduct habeas review, the federal court
may nonetheless be aided by the state court's creation of a complete
factual record. 179 In addition, federal courts may possess an independ-
ent interest besides judicial efficiency in requiring state courts to be-
come more familiar with and inevitably more hospitable toward fed-
eral claims. 180
With respect to procedural default, however, the legitimate inter-
ests that permit a federal court to require exhaustion are lacking. A
federal court that raises procedural default sua sponte as a bar to fed-
eral habeas corpus review does so knowing that no subsequent state
court proceedings can be expected wherein the state courts might
grant the requested relief, clarify the factual record or familiarize
themselves with federal claims. The "delineation of situations in
which federal court deferral pending state proceedings is appropriate
despite the state's waiver or forfeiture of exhaustion all involve a fed-
eral court's protection of its own interests through remands for state
exhaustion proceedings.'' But, "[u]nlike the exhaustion doctrine,
the procedural default doctrine protects only the interests of the States
and not any interests of the federal courts.' 182 Accordingly, several
circuits have held that federal courts may not override a state's deci-
sion to waive the procedural default.
183
state court "may avoid the federal habeas corpus proceeding entirely by granting all the relief
sought in the federal proceeding").
179 See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1987) ('If, for example, the case pres-
ents an issue on which an unresolved question of fact or of state law might have an important
bearing, both comity and judicial efficiency may make it appropriate for the court to insist on
complete exhaustion to make sure that it may ultimately review the issue on a fully informed
basis."); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982) ("[F]ederal claims that have been fully ex-
hausted in state courts will more often be accompanied by a complete factual record to aid the
federal courts in their review."); Thompson, 714 F.2d at 1509 ('In a particular case, fact finding
on the issues with respect to which waiver is asserted may be done best in the state court. The
complete factual record will aid the federal court in its review.") (citation omitted); LIEBMAN &
HERTZ, supra note 109, at 817 n.2 (suggesting that exhaustion in state court "may streamline
federal court proceedings by, for example, resolving difficult predicate issues of state law,
holding evidentiary hearings and making presumptively binding factfindings, and the like")
(citation omitted).
'go See Rose, 455 U.S. at 519 ("As the number of prisoners who exhaust all of their federal
claims increases, state courts may become increasingly familiar with and hospitable toward
federal constitutional issues.") (citation omitted); Thompson, 714 F.2d at 1509 ("[Ihe exhaus-
tion requirement increases state courts' familiarity with and hospitality to federal constitutional
claims.") (citation omitted).
181 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 109, at 817 n.2 (citations omitted).
182 Id.
183 See, e.g., Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515, 1527-28 (11th Cir. 1995) ('The court's sua
sponte invocation of the procedural default to bar relief, despite the State's waiver, served no
important federal interest.... [W]hen ... the state waives a habeas petitioner's procedural
default in failing to obtain appellate review of a claim, the district court should assume that the
waiver is justified."); Henderson v. Thieret, 859 F.2d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[A]lthough a
district court is permitted... to consider a waive[d] defense belatedly raised by the state, even
to raise that defense sua sponte, the court is not permitted to override the state's decision im-
plicit or explicit... to forego that defense.") (emphasis added). See also Harris v. Reed, 489
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But what independent federal interests might permit a federal
court to raise procedural default sua sponte when the State does not
decide to waive the defense but, rather, inadvertently fails to raise it?
According to one authority, "a state's forfeiture or waiver of proce-
dural default, unlike its forfeiture or waiver of exhaustion, removes
all bases for federal court reliance on the default and accordingly
should require federal habeas corpus courts to address the merits of a
petitioner's claims."1'84 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court and the vari-
ous Courts of Appeals have suggested a few independent federal in-
terests, the most important of which is concern for federalism. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell: 
1 85
Resort to habeas corpus ... results in serious intrusions on
values important to our system of government. They include
"(i) the most effective utilization of limited judicial re-
sources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, (iii) the
minimization of friction between our federal and state sys-
tems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded."
186
Although the Court in Powell was not addressing the issue of
raising procedural default sua sponte, it is logical to conclude that a
federal court's reliance on state procedural default, despite a State's
failure to raise that defense, would serve the stated interests by bar-
ring "[r]esort to habeas corpus." In dissent, however, Justice Brennan
noted that "Congressional conferral of federal habeas jurisdiction for
the purpose of entertaining petitions from state prisoners necessarily
manifested a conclusion that such concerns could not be control-
ling, 187 and he emphasized the many countervailing policies in favor
of habeas corpus review.1
88
U.S. 255, 265 n.12 (1989) ("[l]f the state court under state law chooses not to rely on a proce-
dural bar.., then there is no basis for a federal habeas court's refusing to consider the merits of
the federal claim.') (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
"4 LIEBMAN & HERmi , supra note 109, at 817 n.2 (emphasis added).
185 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
186 Id. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
187 Id. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Dest, supra note 10, at 265 ("The [state and
federal] interests are in tension, but they do not actually conflict since the habeas corpus statute,
by its own terms, trumps the state interests."); id. at 293 ("[T]he finality of state court litigation
has been specifically undercut by the availability of collateral federal review under the habeas
corpus statute.").
18 Justice Brennan stated:
There were no 'assumptions' with respect to the construction of the habeas statutes,
but reasoned decisions that [the] policies [relied on by the majority] were an insuffi-
cient justification for shutting the federal habeas door to litigants with federal con-
stitutional claims in light of such countervailing considerations as 'the necessity that
federal courts get the last say with respect to questions of federal law, the inade-
quacy of state procedures to raise and preserve federal claims, the concern that state
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Another possible federal interest in raising procedural default
sua sponte was suggested by the Fourth Circuit in Yeatts v. Ange-
lone.'89 According to the Yeatts court, the interest of judicial effi-
ciency may be served if a federal court "may avoid a decision on a
complex federal question ... by denying relief on the basis of the
adequate and independent state-law ground despite the failure of a
state to assert a procedural bar."' 90 However, it is statements like this
that call into question the legitimacy of raising procedural default sua
sponte if, in fact, it is nothing more than a docket-clearing measure.
"[Flor all courts, excusing procedural defaults ... is costly; it is far
easier to foreclose a claim than to permit its litigation, particularly its
belated litigation, and the temptation to foreclose even when there are
strong contrary arguments may often be powerful."'191
In sharp contrast to the sentiments of the Fourth Circuit is the
notion that federal courts have a duty to exercise their congressionally
created habeas corpus jurisdiction. 192 "[F]ederal court[s possess a]
'virtually unflagging obligation' to exercise civil rights jurisdiction
granted by Congress."'193 Therefore, "the refusal of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction on account of a procedural default amounts to an
unwarranted form of abstention."' 194
Likewise, the need for raising procedural default sua sponte as a
docket-clearing measure is so small that adoption of such a rule on
that basis simply does not justify the potential harm to a federal right-
holder. According to one "study claim[ing] to be only the second
multisite examination of habeas corpus ever and the first empirical
research completed in more than a decade,"'195 habeas petitioners con-
stitute only a small portion of the federal case load19 -and "most ha-
judges may be unsympathetic to federally created rights, [and] the institutional con-
straints on the exercise of this Court's certiorari jurisdiction to review state convic-
tions,' as well as the fundamental belief 'that adequate protection of constitutional
rights relating to the criminal trial process requires the continuing availability of a
mechanism for relief.
Stone, 428 U.S. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S.
217, 225-26 (1969)) (citation omitted).
"' 166 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1999).
"0o Id. at 261.
191 Meltzer, supra note 23, at 1136-37.
'92 See Powell, 428 U.S. at 525-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Federal courts have the duty
to carry out the congressionally assigned responsibility to shoulder the ultimate burden of ad-
judging whether detentions violate federal law.").
193 Dest, supra note 10, at 266 (footnote omitted) (quoting Colorado River Water Cons.
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).9 Id. at 294.
192 Randall Sambom, Habeas Corpus Statistics Reveal Caseload is Light: First Major
Study in a Decade Suggests Reform to Limit Petitions is Unnecessary, Fueling Debate, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 17, 1994, at Al9.
196 See FLANGO, supra note 37, at 20 ("[H]abeas petitions are not a large proportion of
federal caseload. In 1992 habeas cases represented 4.7 percent of civil cases terminated in fed-
eral courts.").
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beas cases take less time than other cases."'197 While the number of
state prisoners has increased, the rate of habeas filings 'has de-
creased. 198 In short, habeas corpus litigation is not running wild. 199
In light of the habeas statistics, a rule that would not permit a
federal court to raise the defense of procedural default sua sponte
would not substantially burden the federal courts. Habeas petitions
are only a small portion of the federal case load.200 Among these peti-
tions only a small percentage of the claims are procedurally de-
faulted.20 Furthermore, for only a very small fraction of the proce-
durally defaulted claims will the State fail to raise its defense. Any
slight reduction in the federal case load that might be realized by sua
sponte invocation does not justify denying habeas relief or forfeiting
the impartiality of the federal courts.
In stark contrast to the judicial efficiency arguments for raising
procedural default sua sponte are the comments of the Supreme Court
in Jenkins v. Anderson.-202 According to that decision the interest of
judicial efficiency may actually be undermined by the belated consid-
eration of a procedural default defense.0 3 Because the state prisoner's
attempt to overcome procedural default by showing "cause and preju-
dice" may turn on a question of state law or on additional facts that
should have been clarified in the state courts below, the defense of
procedural default may prove to be a hardship if raised for the first
time in federal court.2
°4
VI. ENFORCING THE STATE'S INTEREST IN FEDERALISM
While the previous discussion made clear that a federal court's
own interests in raising procedural default sua sponte are either not
legitimate or are specifically undercut by other significant federal in-
terests, 205 another possible justification for raising procedural default
sua sponte is found in the state interest of "federalism." The reason
for characterizing federalism as a "state interest" rather than a "fed-
eral interest" is the simple fact that it is invariably invoked to prevent
federal overreaching of state authority. In the context of raising pro-
'9 Id. at 20-22.
198 See id. at 22 ("Even though the number of state prisoners has nearly quadrupled in the
past 25 years, the rate of habeas filings per prisoner has declined steadily.").
1" See Sambom, supra note 195 ("The most important aspect of this study for me is the
conclusion that habeas corpus cases are not the burden that many people perceive them to be.")
(quoting Professor Ira Robbins of American University, Washington College of Law).
200 See FLANGO, supra note 37, at 20.
201 See id. at 66-67 thl. 19.
2 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
203 See id. at 234 n.1 ("Considerations of judicial efficiency demand that a Sykes [proce-
dural default] claim be presented before a case reaches this Court.").
2o4 See id. ('The applicability of the... 'cause'-and-'prejudice' test may turn on an inter-
pretation of state law.") (citation omitted).
295 See supra Part nM.
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cedural default sua sponte, the issue is whether federal courts are the
proper party within our adversarial system to raise and enforce what
is essentially a state interest.
From the Federalist Papers2 6 to modem decisions involving the
Commerce Clause,207 a debate has raged regarding how best to en-
force the doctrine of federalism. 20 8 On one side of the debate are those
who argue that political constraints within our federalist system offer
sufficient protection for states' interests.2°9 On the other side are those
who argue that judicial enforcement is required as well.210 While one
might concede, at least, that the practice of the Court has been to en-
force the concerns of federalism, the critical question with respect to
raising procedural default sua sponte is whether federal courts should
not only enforce, but also introduce concerns of federalism. In other
words, is the protection of our federalist structure so important that it
becomes an independent interest of the federal courts?
The proper resolution of how best to enforce the interest of fed-
eralism, whether it is a state interest or a federal interest, is beyond
the scope of this Note. However, perhaps a simple change in frame of
reference will suggest a simple solution. While the interest of feder-
alism is commonly relied upon as a state defense, implying adversar-
ial conflict between the state and federal governments, consider for a
moment that the purpose of federalism is to protect the individual
from the government, state or federal. Justice Brennan writes:
Adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to safe-
guard individual rights, the Supreme Court has gone on to
limit the protective role of the federal judiciary. But in so
doing, it has forgotten that one of the strengths of our federal
206 See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison) (1788) (discussing the structural safe-
guards in the federalist system for maintaining the proper role of the states); THE F DERALIST
No. 46 (James Madison) (1788) (discussing the natural advantages for the states in the federal-
ist system).
2w See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that held that Gun-Free
School Zones Act, which made it a federal crime to knowingly possess a firearm where the
possessor knew or had reasonable cause to believe was a school zone, exceeded Congress'
commerce clause authority, since possession of gun in a school zone was not an economic ac-
tivity that substantially affected interstate commerce).
m See STONE ET AL., supra note 74, at 182-88 (discussing the enforcement of federalism
through political constraints versus judicial enforcement).
20 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,552 (1985) ("State
sovereign interests ... are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.").
210 See id. at 566-67 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The fact that Congress generally does not
transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach state activities does not make judicial re-
view any less necessary to rectify the cases in which it does do so.") (footnote omitted).
211 See Brennan, supra note 22, at 442 ("We prize our federalism because of the proved
contributions of our federal structure towards securing individual liberty. The distribution of the
powers of government among many repositories is a sure guarantor against the tyranny and
oppression which so often results from undue concentration of power.").
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system is that it provides a double source of protection for the
rights or our citizens. Federalism is not served when the fed-
eral half of that protection is crippled. 212
According to Justice Brennan, "[flederalism need not be a mean-
spirited doctrine that serves only to limit the scope of human lib-
erty.' 213 Under Justice Brennan's concept of federalism, therefore, a
federal habeas court wishing to serve that principle should strive to
achieve federal review rather than avoid it. A federal court that works
for Justice Brennan's brand of federalism works to maximize protec-
tions for the individual, not protections for the State.
VII. RULE 4 OF THE RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Rule 4 permits a district court to dismiss a state prisoner's peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus before requiring the State to file an
answer to the petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the pe-
tition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled
to relief in the district court., 21 4 On the basis of this rule some circuits
have held that federal courts are permitted to raise the defense of pro-
cedural default sua sponte.21 5 While it is true that Rule 4 "indicates
that Congress intended the courts to play a more active role in § 2254
cases than they generally play in many other kinds of cases, 2 16 the
official comments to the rule reveal that dismissal of a prisoner's pe-
tition before the filing of the State's answer should be based on the
merits of a claim not on procedural defenses.
Rule 4 contemplates a specific sequence of events. If the se-
quence is followed properly, the federal court will not consider pro-
cedural defenses until after it has decided not to order a summary
dismissal. Rather, procedural defenses are considered "where either
dismissal or an order to answer may be inappropriate., 217
The first action contemplated by Rule 4 is an examination of the
petition by the district court in order to "screen out frivolous applica-
tions. 218 Under Rule 4, "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the
petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not enti-
212 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489, 502-03 (1977) (footnote omitted).
213 Id. at 503.
214 Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A.
foil. § 2254 (1994).
215 See, e.g., Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 504 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The district
court's ability to raise a defense... sua sponte is ... consistent with the authority that the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts give to the district courts.").
216 Id.
217 Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A.
foil. § 2254 advisory committee's note (1994) [hereinafter Rule 4 Advisory Committee's Note].
218 Id.
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tied to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its
summary dismissal., 219 Though the rule itself does not make clear
what factors a court should consider in deciding to dismiss at this step
in the process, the remaining sequence of events reveal that the
court's review should be limited to the merits of the claims at this
point. If, for example, the prisoner fails to allege any violations of a
constitutional nature or states claims that are based on a clearly erro-
neous concept of federal law, then the district court should dismiss
the petition without requiring the State to file an answer.
The next step contemplated by Rule 4 is a decision by the district
court regarding whether or not to require the State to file an answer.
If it plainly appears from the face of the petition that the petitioner is
not entitled to relief, then the court shall order dismissal of the peti-
tion. If this is not the case, however, "the judge shall order the re-
spondent to file an answer.., or take such other action as the judge
deems appropriate."
22o
The comments to Rule 4 state:
Rule 4 authorizes the judge to "take such other action as the
judge deems appropriate." This is designed to afford the
judge flexibility in a case where either dismissal or an order
to answer may be inappropriate. For example, the judge may
want to authorize the respondent to make a motion to dismiss
based upon information furnished by respondent, which may
show that petitioner's claims have already been decided on
the merits in a federal court; that petitioner has failed to ex-
haust state remedies; that the petitioner is not in custody...
or that a decision in the matter is pending in state court. In
these situations, a dismissal may be called for on procedural
grounds, which may avoid burdening the respondent with the
necessity of filing an answer on the substantive merits of the
221petition.
Therefore, procedural defenses such as nonexhaustion and presuma-
bly procedural default are to be used by the State to avoid the re-
quirement of filing an answer after the federal court has determined
that dismissal is not appropriate. The inference to be drawn from the
sequence of events is that the court's initial decision to dismiss should
be based on the merits rather than potential procedural defenses.
First, the federal court should decide from the face of the petition
whether a summary dismissal is appropriate. If the court chooses not
to dismiss, it should order the State to file an answer. In the alterna-
219 Rule 4 Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 217.
22 Id. (emphasis added).
22i Id.
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tive, if, after choosing not to dismiss, the State furnishes information
demonstrating procedural grounds for a dismissal, the court, if it
deems it appropriate, "may [dismiss to] avoid burdening the respon-
dent with the necessity of filing an answer on the substantive merits
of the petition."222 Because the various procedural grounds are dis-
cussed as potential bases for avoiding the requirement of filing an
answer in the situation where summary dismissal is not appropriate
and because "the judge may ... authorize the respondent [state] to
make a motion to dismiss based upon information furnished by [the]
respondent [state],"'223 Rule 4 does not contemplate sua sponte invo-
cation of procedural bars by the federal court. The "more active role"
of the federal courts under Rule 4 involves dismissing petitions that
would not succeed on the merits if the State were required to address
those substantive merits in an answer; it does not involve raising pro-
cedural defenses sua sponte when dismissal on the merits is not war-
ranted.
VIII. ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
The arguments which have been discussed for and against rais-
ing procedural default sua sponte must be considered in the context of
our adversarial system of justice. Although the specific policies that
are implicated by collateral habeas corpus review may or may not
suggest divergence from the general rule, nevertheless, there is a gen-
eral rule that a court should not raise affirmative defenses for the
parties.224 As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he rule that points not
argued will not be considered is more than just a prudential rule of
convenience; its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases,
distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial
one." Accordingly, at least one circuit has already advised against
raising procedural default sua sponte when the state has never raised
that issue before. 26
2Id.
23Id.
224 See Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Generally, where the
parties have not raised a defense, the court should not address the defense sua sponte.").
= United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
226 The Third Circuit has held that:
[W]here the state has never raised the issue [of procedural default] at all, in any
court, raising the issue sua sponte puts us in the untenable position of ferreting out
possible defenses upon which the state has never sought to rely. When we do so, we
come dangerously close to acting as advocates for the state rather than as impartial
magistrates. While considerations of federalism and comity sometimes weigh in fa-
vor of raising such issues sua sponte, consideration of that other great pillar of our
judicial system-restrain--cuts sharply in the other direction.
Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400,409 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
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In addition to the general prohibition against raising issues not
already raised by the parties, our adversary system counsels the court
to treat the parties equally. Consequently, if a state prisoner's proce-
dural-defaults will be enforced strictly, a State's failure to comply
with federal procedures, likewise, should be strictly enforced.2 7
Moreover, in the habeas context, the specific conditions of the parties
may actually counsel in favor of stricter enforcement against the
State.228 Therefore, unless an exception is made on other grounds, the
practice of excusing a State's failure to raise its affirmative defense of
procedural default cannot be justified when the habeas petitioner's
own failure to present his federal claims in state court will not like-
wise be excused.
IX. CONCLUSION
A rule that would permit federal courts to raise the State's de-
fense of procedural default sua sponte affords inadequate respect for
the "Great Writ of Liberty" and overvalues the oft-cited interests of
comity and federalism. Upon first review, the Supreme Court should
make clear that sua sponte invocation of the affirmative defense of
procedural default as a means of barring federal habeas corpus review
constitutes an improper form of abstention from the court's proper
jurisdiction that is contrary to the very purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus. Although a dramatic shift in priorities has caused the Court in
recent years to increasingly restrict federal habeas corpus, at one time
the Court rarely enforced state procedural defaults-a far cry from
invoking them sua sponte. Accepting the fact that the Court may
never return the writ to its former status of "greatness," a rule that
would permit a federal court to raise comity based defenses in addi-
tion to the already troublesome limitations on federal review, simply
tips the scale too far in favor of denying the vindication of federal
rights.
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227 See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 109, at 646-47 ("[ln keeping with the equitable
imperative to treat litigants on both sides of a lawsuit the same, most federal courts... have
recognized the need to apply waiver doctrines as strictly against the States and Federal Govern-
ment as against habeas corpus petitioners.") (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 648 ("Because 'the lawyers employed by a state attorney general should be
masters' of federal habeas corpus law and defenses, and because states' attorneys are better
placed than federal judges to know when a State's federalism and comity interests are at stake,
those attorneys at the least should be held to procedural standards that are no less exacting than
those applied to pro se prisoners.") (footnotes omitted).
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